Preface

This paper mainly focuses on the concept of Nanpō kyōei ken (the Southern Co-Prosperity Sphere) in colonial Taiwan before the Pacific War. On one hand, it will explore the position of Nanpō kyōei ken in the thought of Daitōa kyōei ken (the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere). On the other hand, it will illustrate one facet of the Nanshinron (South-advanced theory) in the modern period. The details of Nanpō kyōei ken have already been discussed at length under the subject of Japanese enterprises’ “economic entrance” in Southeast Asia. This paper will illustrate the political, military, and economic thought that disseminated from Japan. In fact, Yasuyuki Hikita had studied Nanpō kyōei ken and focused on the regions occupied by the Japanese army; he discussed several factors in controlling the local economy. Therefore, in his study of the term of Nanpō kyōei ken, which emerged in World War II and disappeared after the war, he introduced the essentiality of its geography and analyzed its history from an economic perspective. Hikita argued that after the Pacific War the areas occupied by the Japanese army, including French Indochina, Thailand, and East Timor, were seen geographically as the Nanpō kyōei ken. The concept became a common consensus among the Japanese people.
Furthermore, regarding the activities of Japanese enterprises, he maintained a far different viewpoint from the scholarship of the military administration and described a different image of the Nanpō kyōei ken. He argued that although the Oriental Development Co., the Taiwan Development Co., and the South Manchuria Railways Co. owned some subsidiary companies in the region, there was no national company targeting profits from businesses in the Southern Co-Prosperity Sphere.¹

However, in Hikita’s research, the Nanpō kyōei ken was regarded merely as a regional concept in the war period and was substituted for the region of Southeast Asia in the postwar period. Also, in the background discussion of the regionalization caused by the concept of Daitōa kyōei ken, there was no discussion about the formation of the thought of Nanpō kyōei ken. Therefore, the problem arose in the meaning of Nanpō kyōei ken, which was seen merely as a regional concept, much like “Nanpō (the South)” or “Nanyō (the Southern Ocean)”.

To define Nanpō kyōei ken enables us to figure out the connection between “Nanshinron” and “Daitōa kyōei ken,” which was a positive narrative of invading Southeast Asia and South Pacific Ocean. It has also been proven that the Konoe Fumimaro (近衛文麿) Cabinet started to use the phrase “Daitōa kyōei ken” in July

of 1940. This phrase is involved in several aspects of politics, military, economics, and culture in the region of Nanshi nanyō (the Southern China and Southern Ocean). However, both of the interpretations of Nanpō kyōei ken were understood as one part of the Daitōa kyōei ken. Likewise, the changes in Japanese national policy in early 1940s were taken seriously. The situation caused Taiwan to become the intellectual center. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to compare the Nanpō kyōei ken in Taiwan and the Daitōa kyōei ken in Japan, to indicate the differences, and to discuss the beginnings of the “Nanpō kyōei ken” centered in Taiwan. Moreover, the intellectual background of politics and economics in Taiwan will be introduced, and the discourses of authorities in Taiwan Governor-General, civil societies, and researchers will be brought forth in order to examine the formation of the discourse of Nanpō kyōei ken.

1. The Position of the Nanpō kyōei ken in the Daitōa kyōei ken

Where were Taiwan and the Southeast Asia/the South Pacific Ocean located in Daitōa kyōei ken? Before answering this question, the structure of the Daitōa kyōei ken should first be discussed. The so-called Daitōa kyōei ken was a primary point of

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Kihon kokusaku yōkō (The basic points of national policy), which was decided on July 26th, 1940, at the second meeting of the Konoe Fumimaro Cabinet. Its content regarded the economic community consisting of Japan, Manchuria, and China, with Southeast Asia placed in the position of providing resources and the South Pacific Ocean placed in the position of national defense sphere. It was claimed that Daitōa kyōei ken was a broad community centered on Japan and was self-sufficiency. In fact, the idea of integrating Japan, Manchuria, and China into an economic community had been previously called Tōa shinchitsujo (the New order in East Asia) by the first Konoe Fumimaro Cabinet in 1938. From February to June of 1940, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Arita Hachirō (有田八郎) introduced foreign policy, including the Nanpō. Before long, the Japanese army entered into Northern French Indochina in August 1940 and reinforced its domination in the Nanpō. After the army occupied southern French Indochina in July 1941 the result was a turning point and generated the Daitōa senso (the Greater East Asia War). In brief, Daitōa kyōei ken combined the Tōa shinchitsujo with the political, military, and economic spheres of Southeast

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3 “Kihon kokusaku yōkō,” Ref. B02030544700, Japan Center for Asian Historical Record, National Archives of Japan.

4 “Teikoku seifu seimei (3rd Nov. Shōwa 13th),” Ref.B02030528700, Japan Center for Asian Historical Record, National Archives of Japan.

5 “January 1st Shōwa 15th tsūsyōjōyaku shikkogo no nichibeiikankei oyobi sekaishinchitsujo no kihon gensoku ni genkyūseru Arita Gaijin no gikai enzetsu,” and “29th June Shōwa 15th nanyō syouchihō o fukumu Daitōa kyōei ken kensetsu no ito o hyōmeiseru Arita daitin no hōsō,” Ref.B02030741500, Japan Center for Asian Historical Record, National Archives of Japan.

Asia/the South Pacific Islands. From the perspective of its intellectual trends, it possessed a Pan-Asian nature.\(^7\)

The next question is why the Southeast Asia region of *Daitōa kyōei ken* transformed into *Nanpō kyōei ken* because of the changed policy in Japan. There are two possible reasons. First, placing the Southern Pacific Ocean area in the national defense sphere increased the political and military value of Southeast Asia around Taiwan. Second, naming this place as the base of resources and supplies in *Daitōa kyōei ken* increased the economic value of Taiwan and the Southeast Asia region.

In my opinion, there was no specific author who created the phrase *Nanpō kyōei ken*.\(^8\) However, there were some studies regarding the *Nanyō/Nanpō*, two basic terms signifying *Nanpō kyōei ken*. In Shimizu Hajime’s research, *Nanyō* could be broken down into *Uchi Nanyō* (the inner Southern Ocean) and *Soto Nanyō* (the outer Southern Ocean). The *Uchi Nanyō* was the term in use after the World War I and signified the Japanese League of Nations mandate consisting of the several German possessions such as Marianas, Carolines, and Marshall Islands. The *Soto Nanyō* signified the area in the South Pacific Ocean aside from the *Uchi Nanyō*. Moreover, the term *Tōnan Ajiya* (Southeast Asia), which is the same as the modern region today,

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8 Though the phrase “*Nanpō kyōei ken*” was used in the newspapers published in Japan at more early stage, all of arguments regarding “*Nanpō kyōei ken*” appeared after the “*Kihon kokusaku yōkō*.” At this stage, there was no real concept of concrete policy such as the definition of region etc.
emerged in national geography textbooks for the first time. According to Hikita Yasuyuki’s study, Nanpō was used to designate the region to the south of Japan and was often used as a synonym of Nanyō. But Nanpō also included the part that is not adjacent to the ocean. Therefore, the range of Nanpō is broader than that of Nanyō. In fact, Japan paid more attention to the Nanpō and then the nature of Nanshinron changed from an ideal theory to a real situation. We find the situation in a contemporary’s review below:

Now we should rethink that: How many people really know about the Nanyō? Or how many truly study the people of Nanyō? Didn’t the Japanese pay attention to the South occur after the break out of the Daitōa senso? No matter, there have been some who have orally advocated the Nanshinron so far. How many people were there to study and prepare for actually implementing it? ......

Just like a patient suffering from a fever, they have to talk about Nanyō or they cannot feel they are Japanese in the period of Daitōa senso.

This is the context within which the Japanese formed the regional concept of Southeast Asia and South Pacific.

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10 Hikita Yasuyuki, ”’Nanpō kyōei ken’kenkyū no kadai to Nihon no senji keizai shihai no tokutō,” in “Nanpō kyōei ken”—senji Nihon no tōnan ajia keizai shihai, p.4.
The first appearance of Nanpō kyōei ken read by the people in Taiwan was in Taiwannichinchishinpō on Oct. 13th, 1940, when Ministry of Colonial Affairs Akita Kiyoshi gave a talk. He explained that in order to establish national defense, it was necessary to integrate inner and outer territories into the one, combining both of the material and spiritual aspects. Likewise, with the development of Manchuria, the Ministry of Colonial Affairs should make the “establishment of Nanpō kyōei ken” function well. 12 It should be noted that the narrative already involved Taiwan and Southeast Asia, the source of resources and supplies, and the Southern Pacific area, a part of the national defense sphere. In other words, the meaning of Nanpo in Nanpō kyōei ken had a definition, from which Japan, Manchuria and China were excluded.

It is also necessary to discuss how Japanese intellectuals defined the Nanpō kyōei ken. For example, while Akita was giving his talk, the argument of some publications, which operated under the idea of Asianism, was that as a leader of “the new order in East Asia”, Japan had to utilize the economic resources of Nanpo for competing against the Euro-American economic bloc, the Monroe Doctrine in the USA. However, though Nanpō kyōei ken was included in these publications’ names, like in Akita’s talk mentioned above, their arguments about national policy in this

12 “Akita takusyō dan Nanpō kyōei ken kakuritsu e zenteki na kinō o hakki,” Taiwannichinchishinpō (1940/10/13), Yukan 2.
period concerning the South-advanced theory of the Southeast Asia region in Japan had not advanced beyond the level of rough introduction.\textsuperscript{13} The reification of \textit{Nanpō kyōei ken}'s status in \textit{Daitōa kyōei ken} became somewhat clear on the eve of the outbreak of the Pacific War in December of 1941. For instance, according to the professor of Matsuyama High School Sumitani Etsuji (住谷悅治), the Professor Emeritus of Dōshisha University after World War II, the \textit{Nanpō kyōei ken} had only an incomplete formation. From the perspective of a regional concept, it was equal to Indonesian peninsula and Malaysian archipelago, including Philippines, British Borneo, Dutch Indonesian, and Portuguese Timor, etc. The basis of \textit{Nanpō kyōei ken}'s range included in \textit{Daitōa kyōei ken} was decided according to the “familiarity” with Japan, taking in consideration criteria such as the conditions of history, geography, race, life, culture, etc.\textsuperscript{14} He said the “incomplete formation” was based on the premise that Japan began to expand its total war power using the smallest amount of necessary resources, foods, and money. In addition, the racial “familiarity” of Southeast Asia is based on the racial similarity to the Japanese, a viewpoint of Asianism. In sum, the range of \textit{Nanpō kyōei ken} was dependent on the expansion or reduction of the Pacific War’s scale in 1942. Likewise, the war naturally enlarged the

\textsuperscript{13} Iizawa Syōji, \textit{Nanpō kyōei ken} (Tōkyō: Takayama syoyoin), 1940; Hayasaka Yoshio, \textit{Nanpō kyōei ken to sono seikaku} (Tōkyō: Kasumigaseki syobō, 1940.
\textsuperscript{14} Sumitani Etsuji, \textit{Daitōa kyōei ken syokumin ron} (Tōkyō: Seikatsusya, 1942), 184-185.

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range of *Daitōa kyōei ken*. Therefore, limited by the rule of *Daitōa kyōei ken*, the structure of *Nanpō kyōei ken* can be presented by way of function:

\[
X\text{(Japan exists alone and absolutely)} + Y\text{(Manchuria, China, Mongolia, Chinese Turkestan, and Nanpō kyōei ken)} = A\text{(Daitōa kyōei ken)}
\]

On the other hand, some concrete contents of *Nanpō kyōei ken* were discussed by the government. In 1942, at the 79th Imperial Parliament, Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki (東條英機) answered some questions regarding the critical arguments of *Nanpō kyōei ken*. Seven items were introduced, including (1) excluding thoroughly the exploitation by the US and the British; (2) recognizing the significance of the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia; (3) reconfirming the position of the northern problem; (4) establishing the economy of *Daitōa kyōei ken* centered on Japan and pursuing prosperous coexistence; (5) managing currency finance by using the Japanese Yen in the South; (6) resolving the problem of transportation by shipping; (7) nurturing Japanese human resource for advancing the South. Therefore, while government indicated the guidelines, the discussion of the South became popular in Japan and Taiwan.

So far, it seems that the Southern area became a bloc of *Nanpō kyōei ken* when the

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second Konoe Fumimaro Cabinet introduced the *Daitōa kyōei ken*. In fact, in my opinion, materials containing the phrase *Nanpō kyōei ken* were rare in the Japanese Imperial Parliament before World War II. Therefore, it was a semiofficial phrase involving Taiwan and the Southeast Asia, and existed in the narratives of *Daitōa kyōei ken*. From now on, this paper will focus on *Nanpō kyōei ken* and illustrate various agents in Taiwan in order to examine the details of *Nanpō kyōei ken*.

2. The Position of Taiwan and its Political Role in *Nanpō kyōei ken*.

The political and military role of Taiwan is crucial in understanding the content of *Daitōa kyōei ken*. In Taiwan, the discussion began after the proclamation of *Tōa shinchitsujo* by first Konoe Fumimaro Cabinet. In fact, as one part of national defense and economic sphere, the significance of the South was discussed in the context of “Taiwan is the base for South-advanced” before Ministry of Foreign Affairs Arita introduced the notion of *Daitōa kyōei ken*.

In political and military fields, the content of *Nanpō kyōei ken* can be understood from the materials of the Japanese government. These materials can be separated into five items, including (1) the thought of *Daitōa kyōei ken*; (2) military administration;...
(3) the racial policy of the Great East Asia; (4) the overseas Chinese in Southern Pacific Ocean; and (5) the establishment of central government in the South. The discussion of (2) military administration was briefed due to the limited context available.\(^{19}\) However, the discussions from (3) to (5) regarded the reaction in Taiwan. First, the racial policy of the Great East Asia referred to the policy of ruling natives in the Southeast Asia region, which dictated utilizing the original and native administrations and institutions, facilitating the research about each race, and establishing the ideal of uniting all races. Therefore, the Institute of Ethnology was established for these aims. As for the overseas Chinese in Southern Pacific Ocean, this involved the strategy for dealing with overseas Chinese “Guerilla”, the overseas Chinese estates and their management, the business war between the overseas Chinese and Japanese, the strategy of the Hong Kong Chinese, and the work of dealing with the overseas Chinese implemented by Taiwanese, etc. The establishment of central government in the South was concerned with the integration and rationalization of Taiwan Governor-General, the Nanyō District, and the Japanese government Office.\(^{20}\)

However, while the Japanese government proclaimed the status of Taiwan in the Southern Policy, a decision *Nanpō ni okeru Taiwan no chiyi ni kansuruken* was made

\(^{19}\) Regarding the military administration in Southeast Asia at the Pacific War, see Iwatake Teruhiko, *Nanpōgunseironsyū* (Tōkyō: Gannandō syoten, 1989).

\(^{20}\) “Tyōsashiryō No.3, No.77, No.78, No.79 Teikokugikai shinakankei shitsugi ōtōsyū,” Ref. A06033007700, Japan Center for Asian Historical Record, National Archives of Japan.
in the Cabinet conference on June 24th, 1941, and was announced to the Taiwan Governor-General confidentially. It was comprised of the following three principles:

(1) Taking the geographic or other characteristics into consideration, make Taiwan the southern base of Imperial Japan to utilize these features.

(2) Following (1), Taiwan Governor-General conformed to the Southern Policy as decided by central government, was engaged in building the facilities and developing businesses in Taiwan, and assisted the affairs of imperial officials in the southern area.

(3) Taiwan Governor-General tries to achieve the establishment of assistant facilities and businesses mentioned above, the demand concerning military, the application of Taiwanese status, resources, and experience, and the adaption of conciliating the relationship between each authority.21

Moreover, while the official document was issued, the other one, Nanpō syochihō ni okeru teikoku desaki kanken no jimu ni kansuru Taiwansōtokufu no kyōryoku ni kansuruken22, based on the decisions of the cabinet conference, was issued as well. It was decided that Taiwan Governor-General should conform to the instructions issued

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21 “Nanpō seisaku ni okeru Taiwan no chiyi ni kansuruken,” Ref. A03023596700, Japan Center for Asian Historical Record, National Archives of Japan.
22 Ibid.
by the central government, actively assist, and keep a close connection between it and the related authorities. On the one hand, according to the decision made by the Cabinet conference, the Taiwan Governor-General was engaged in the arrangement of the development of the facilities and businesses in Taiwan. On the other hand, the Taiwan Governor-General cooperated with the arrangement regarding Southern China, Hainan, French Indo-China, and Thailand, etc. In the assistant outline designed by Taiwan Governor-General, the terms of military dispatch, cultural relationship, economic relationship, public business, communication, the mobilization of Taiwanese youths for public service, and the training of technical personnel for tropical agriculture were decided. Within this document, cultural relationship, economic relationship, and public business were separated into more detailed instructions. The details on cultural relationship involved journalism, educational facilities, medical facilities, propaganda, and measures for pacification (as well as others matters such as the related civil societies in the South). Economic relationship was divided into financial assistance and various industries. Public business was divided into electrification, gas, sewers, refrigeration industry, river transportation, and others, such as the business of Taiwan Development Company in Hainan.\(^{23}\)

\(^{23}\) *Taiwansōtokufu gaijibu, Taiwan no nanpō kyōryoku ni tsuite* (Taihoku: Taiwansōtokufu gaijibu, 1943); *Taiwansōtokufu gaijibu, Nanpōkyōei kensetsujō ni okeru Taïwan no chiyō ni tsuite* (Taihoku: Taiwansōtokufu gaijibu, 1943).

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Although the Taiwan Governor-General implemented each item based on the demand of Japan, the items of (3) the racial policy of the Great East Asia, (4) the overseas Chinese in the Southern Pacific Ocean, and (5) the establishment of central government in the South (regarding the political and military guidelines of the Japanese government) were difficult to pin down in detail. In fact, it is generally known that in the structure of law, the Taiwan Governor-General was merely an executive body in the outer territory and was unable to make political decisions alone. However, it is worth noting what the opinions on (3), (4), and (5) in Taiwan were. I give some examples in what follows.

First, concerning the racial policy of the Great East Asia and the overseas Chinese in the Southern Pacific Ocean, one author thinks that the political mission of Taiwan was shown by how Taiwan devoted itself to facilitating the conciliation between Japan and various southern races in the Daiōa kyōei ken. Specifically, Taiwan’s utilized its accumulated experience and knowledge of the Chinese and the races in Southeast Asia and to mobilize Taiwanese human resources, and then to apply these resources to the cooperative works in China or the Southern Pacific Ocean. Although its content focuses on the overseas Chinese strategy, it can be seen that the achievement of assimilation policy, the Kōminka (becoming Japanese) Policy, adopted
by Taiwanese Governor-General after 1937, was overstated. Moreover, out of items (3), (4), and (5), it can be seen that the investigation regarding (4) the overseas Chinese in Southern Pacific Ocean was more popular in published articles and publications than (3) the racial policy of the Great East Asia and (5) the establishment of central government in the South; this is due to the fact that the subject of the overseas Chinese in Southern Pacific Ocean was not only a political problem but also an economic one, involving in many factors. As for (5) the establishment of central government in the South, the discussion of creating the “Southern Governor-General” for raising the status of the Taiwan Governor-General arose after the idea of *Daitōa kyōei ken* was proclaimed in July 1940. Namura Akira, a professor of constitution in the Department of Letters and Politics of Taihoku Imperial University, said that starting in October 1940, influenced by the unitary *Taisei Yokusen Undō* (a campaign of political mobilization), Japanese party politics was engaged in uniting the *Kōayin* (the Ministry of Asian Development), the authority dealing with the affairs regarding China, the Ministry of Colonial Affairs, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the purpose of integrating the authorities ruling outer territories and establishing the

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Southern Governor-General for an outer authority of southern territory. In fact, this idea is the consistent position of Shōwa Kenkyūkai (Shōwa Research Society), but the Ministry of Colonial Affairs, Kōayin, Taiman jimukyoku (the Bureau of Manshūkoku’s Affairs), Tōakyoku (the Bureau of East Asia) and Nanyōkyoku (the Bureau of Southern Ocean) of Ministry of Foreign Affairs were integrated into the Daiōasyō (the Ministry of Greater East Asia). The result was dissimilar to Nakamura’s argument that Taiwan Governor-General became the center and held the authority to direct and supervise the Southeast Asia region; rather, the supervisor of the Taiwan Governor-General was changed from Ministry of Colonial Affairs to Home Ministry.

In my opinion, the critical factor is that the legal relationship and command system existing between Japan and Taiwan was a vertical administrative management. Also, during the war period, the slogans of Kōminka, Hakkōyichiw (Japanese cosmopolitism), or Kōdō (the benevolent Imperial rule) were introduced in Taiwan. In this situation, substantial discussions decreased gradually. It was thought that Taiwan was in the “imperial” Japan and in this kind of political structure, and therefore the real role of Taiwan in the Nanpō kyōei ken was an outlet for their frustrations and was narrated in the context of economic entrance.

26 Nakamura Akira, “Nanpōsōtokuron,” Taiwan jihō 251 (Nov. 1940).
3. The Theory of Building Nanpō kyōei ken in Taiwan and its Economic Role

What is the main idea supporting the establishment of Nanpō kyōei ken? The problem of building the central authority in the South was roughly solved by the establishment of the Daitōasyō (Ministry of Greater East Asia). But the policy of ruling native races and the overseas Chinese was discussed continuously in Japan and Taiwan. It can be seen as the main tenet of the colonial policy theory. In brief, the ruling policy of Taiwan and Korea after the Meiji Restoration in modern Japan became the foundation and the southern policy became a new research topic and a theoretical core from which to build the periphery of Nanpō kyōei ken.27

In Taiwan, the center of Nanpō kyōei ken, what is the main idea? According to Nanpō ni okeru Taiwan no chiyi ni kansuraken, decided in the cabinet conference on June 24th, 1941, as the second critical place Taiwan is the central base for resource supply. Thus, its incomplete role in politics and military was replaced by economic and cultural works. For example, after the content of Nanpō ni okeru Taiwan no chiyi ni kansuraken was classified, there were four main items involving economics, public business, culture, and mobilization for war. The Taiwan Governor-General stressed the experiences that were features specific to Taiwan such as ruling non-native races,

27Sumitani Etsuji, Daitōa kyōei kensetsu no kihi mondai (Tókyō: Naigai shoin, 1943); Kosuga Minoru ed., Nanpō kensetsu no kōza (Tókyō: Ōsaka yagō shoten, 1943).
tropical medicine, agriculture and forestry, and Japanese language education. In terms of politics, economics, and culture, Taiwan and the South were indivisible.28

However, on October 27th, 1941 before the Pacific War, the conference “Rinji Taiwankeizai shingikai” (the temporary economic conference) was held by the Taiwan Governor-General with the main goal of “making Taiwan a industrial south-advanced base.”29 Thus, the “Agriculture Taiwan” was transformed into the “Industrial south-advanced base” in Nanpō kyōei ken, which aims to reorganize industries. The primary reason for this reorganization was the economic demands during the war period before the outbreak of the Pacific War. For example, the intention was to encourage the steel and shipbuilding industries, to attract military factories, and to enhance processing industries of agriculture and fishery, power, and the Southern Japanese ocean liners.30

It should be noted that before the outbreak of the Pacific War, the status of Taiwan changed gradually from a “south-advanced base” to a “south-advanced transit” in Nanpō kyōei ken centered on Southeast Asia. Kusui Ryūzō (楠井隆三), an economics professor in the Department of Letters and Politics of Taihoku Imperial University, thought that the situation involving the Daitōasyō (the Ministry of Greater East Asia),

28Taiwansōtokufu gaijibu, Taiwān no nanpō kyōryoku ni tsuite, 80.
29Taiwansōtokufu, Rinji Taiwankeizai shingikai gikaigijji sokkirioku (Taihoku: Taiwansōtokufu, 1941), 1-2.
30Mochizuki Shinsuke, Daitōa kyōeiken no kensetsu to Taiwan no motsu shimei (Tōkyō: Kōa keizai kenkyūjo, 1941).
in which Taiwan was transferred to the Home Ministry, means that “(Taiwan) is not an ‘outer territory’ of Imperial Japan but a ‘new inner territory.’ The nature of outer territory should be abandoned and replaced by the nature of inner territory as soon as possible.” He discussed the people and materials involved further and brought up three critical points regarding the abandonment. First, in terms of people, races the population of Taiwan includes Japanese, Chinese, and aborigines. But this heterogeneity was assimilated into one homogeneous race; these different races were integrated with “Yamato race” and completely became a united “Japanese people.” This is “abandon of nature of outer territory and advance toward nature of inner territory.” In terms of materials, Taiwan’s primary system of industry and economy was agriculture, but heavy and scientific industries had developed insufficiently. Industrial products still relied heavily on the import of parts from Japan. However, Ryūzō explained that the industrialization in Taiwan caused reduced dependence and introduced industry into the original agricultural economy. Therefore, Taiwanese economy became similar to the Japanese industrial economy and underwent Japanization or “Quasi-Japanization.” As for other aspects of the nature of outer territory, the original administration was abandoned due to the fact that Daitōasyō was built and Taiwan was transferred to the Home Ministry. Therefore, the three points of
abandonment mentioned above meant that Taiwan aimed to become a part of Japan. Also, these points show that Taiwan was devoted to the establishment of Nanpō kyōei ken. In other words, as a “quasi-inner territory” and “second inner territory,” the abandonment meant the capacity of providing something possessing the nature of inner territory to other “new outer territories” in the Great East Asia area.\textsuperscript{31}

Kusui’s analysis hit the crucial points regarding the relationship between Nanpō kyōei ken and the situation politics and economics in Japan and Taiwan. Utilizing his argument is helpful for the discussion in this paper. Taiwan’s Kōminka policy was the Japanization of people and Taiwan’s industrialization was the Japanization of materials; both were a kind of vector function. Moreover, he explored the multiplier effect of transferring Taiwan to the Home Ministry and raising the administrative status of Taiwan. He also discussed the possibility that total Taiwan, as a “quasi-inner territory,” turned to Nanpō kyōei ken and caused a change of political-economic dynamics. This can be presented in functional relations:

\[ X(\text{Kōminka}) + Y(\text{Industrialization}) \times Z(\text{Transferring to the Home Ministry}) = A(\text{“Quasi-Japanization” in Taiwan}) \]

\textsuperscript{31} Kusui Ryūzō, Senji Taiwan keizairon (Taiboku: Nanpō jinbun kenkyūjo, 1944), 332-335.
A+B (the “Abandonment of the nature of outer territory” in the Southeast Asia) = 

C (the dynamics and reality of Nanpō kyōei ken)

It goes without saying that the “abandon of the nature of outer territory” in Southeast Asia under military administration means the Japanization and subordination of Southeast Asia countries and colonies, and if we want to speculate on the value of quantity and quality, we need another examination. But whereas these phenomena arose in Taiwan and Japan, to access the reality of Nanpō kyōei ken requires going back to the turning point of politics, economics, and culture. In sum, before the dawn of the Pacific War, although the thought of Nanpō kyōei ken possessed the feature of regional concept, as a receptor Taiwan adopted the “abandon of the nature of outer territory and advance toward nature of inter territory” that centers on Kōminika and industrialization, and pulled the Southeast Asia region into Nanpō kyōei ken. Also, because the policy dynamics despised the natives in Southeast Asia and colonies, an “ambiguity (an opaque nature of reality)” of thought naturally arose. Thus, in order to understand the reality of Nanpō kyōei ken, the degree of ambiguity must be clearly and analytically answered from the perspective of quality and quantity.
Conclusion

So far, it has been determined that, on the one hand, the slogan *Daitōa kyōei ken* was advocated in Japan, and that, on the other hand, the discourse of *Nanpō kyōei ken* was used in colonial Taiwan before the Pacific War. According to the conclusions of this research, it can be understood that the idea of political, economic, and cultural community centered on Taiwan was deliberate. This is a broad area, but different from the term of *Daitōa kyōei ken* in Japan. However, despite the problems with political, military, and economic roles being introduced at the same time, the importance of the economic role surpassed that of political and military roles because Taiwan had no sufficient legal foundation in Imperial Japan. Without the power of making political decisions, the administrative authorities and business societies surrounding the Taiwan Governor-General began to propose the idea of *Nanpō kyōei ken*. Does that mean that political dynamics existing in *Daitōa kyōei ken* consolidated its status openly? According to my investigation, relative to the phrase *Daitōa kyōei ken* in Japan, the materials including the phrase of *Nanpō kyōei ken* are few. Even if the thought is unofficial, centering on Taiwan and introducing the community including Southeast Asia and the Southern Pacific Ocean remains significant.